University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2002

Dear President Bush
Carl W. Tobias
University of Richmond, ctobias@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons
Recommended Citation
Carl Tobias, Dear President Bush, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (2002)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

MISSOURI
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME67

WINTER2002

NUMBERl

Dear President Bush*
Carl Tobias**

Congratulations on winning an extremely close election to become the
forty-third President. Now, you must apply all ofthe political and organizational
ability exhibited in the campaign if you are to discharge successfully the
daunting responsibilities of governing. One critical duty that the Constitution
assigns the chief executive is the power to nominate and, with the Senate's
advice and consent, to appoint federal judges. 1 These life-tenured officials
resolve the most controversial issues of the day, implicating, for example,
abortion, the death penalty, and federalism. Judi9ial selection has assumed even
greater significance today in light of changed public perceptions that the courts
are increasingly the final arbiters of societal disputes, as Bush v. Gorfil so
tellingly illustrates.
The opportunity to shape the bench is yours. President Bill Clinton named
half of the current appellate and district judges, as well as two Supreme Court
Justices during his tenure in office. However, ninety vacancies remained on the
lower federal courts when you were inaugurated. There also will be two
hundred additional openings in the next four years, as active Article III judges
assume senior status, resign, or die and as Congress authorizes new judicial
positions. Moreover, several Supreme Court Justices might retire. Capitalizing
on this situation will require the exercise of consummate skill because your lack
of a public mandate and the new Senate composition may exacerbate the task's
already complex nature by further politicizing it. Indeed, the facility with which
you treat the crucial responsibility to choose judges will affect profoundly both
the federal courts and your legacy.

* This piece was written immediately after the 2000 election.
**Professor ofLaw, William S. Boyd School ofLaw, University ofNevada, Las
Vegas. The Author wishes to thank Chris Bryant, Jay Bybee, Michael Higdon, and
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Mike Gillooly for processing this piece, and Jim
Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are the Author's.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2.
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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I. A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF MODERN FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION
When Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1976, few female and a
minuscule number of minority judges served on the federal appeals or district
bench.3 President Carter assigned the appointment of more women and
minorities a top priority and instituted special efforts to attain this objective. For
instance, he requested that senators seek out, identify, and propose female and
minority candidates, as well as create district court nominating commissions that
would facilitate their selection.4 Nearly sixteen percent of Carter appointees
were women, and more than twenty percent were minorities. 5
Ronald Reagan claimed that his 1980 victory was a mandate from the
electorate to make the bench more politically conservative.6 The :President
searched for and appointed many judges with those ideological views but chose
very few female or minority lawyers. In fact, less than two percent of his
appointments were African Americans. 7 When your father, George Bush,
captured the White House in 1988, he honored President Reagan's commitment

3. See Robert J. Lipshutz & Douglas B. Huron, Achieving a More Representative
Federal Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483, 483 (1979); Elliott E. Slotnick, Lowering the
Bench or Raising It Higher?: Affinnative Action and Judicial Selection During the
Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 270, 271 (1983).
4. See generally ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES 33-35 (1981 ); Federal
Judicial Selection: The Problems and Achievements of Carter's Merit Plan, 62
JUDICATURE 463 (1979) (This issue is solely devoted to President Carter's method of
federal judicial selection.).
5. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle
and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 322, 325 (1989) [hereinafter Goldman, Reagan's
Judicial Legacy]; Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 BYUL. REV.
1257, 1261 [hereinafter Tobias, Rethinking]. For more discussion of the Carter
Administration, see SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 236-84 (1997).
6. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FuNo TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 60 (1988); Sheldon Goldman,
Reagan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-tenn: Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66
JUDICATURE 334, 347 (1983).
7. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 5, at 322, 325; Tobias,
Rethinking, supra note 5, at 1269. For more discussion of the Reagan Administration,
see GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 285-345; O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 60-64.
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by moving the courts to the right. 8 Your father named numerous relatively
conservative judges and few minorities. 9 However, he did choose many women.
When Bill Clinton became president in 1992, observers found that he deemphasized political ideology, while stressing competence and diversity in the
selection process. 10 As the chief executive, Clinton appointed highly capable
judges who enhanced political, gender, and racial balance, naming
unprecedented numbers of women and minorities.11 Nevertheless, there were
ninety judicial vacancies at his administration's conclusion.

II. JUDICIAL SELECTION DURING THE NEXT FOUR YEARS
A. Goals and Reasons for Achieving the Objectives

1. Merit and Filling the Judicial Vacancies
You should formulate clear, praiseworthy selection goals. You must
emphasize merit by seeking to guarantee that nominees are extremely intelligent,
industrious, and independent; possess much integrity; and have balanced judicial
temperament. You also should strive to fill all of the current vacancies. If the
judiciary comprises exceptionally able jurists and operates with all 844 active
appeals and trial court judges whom Congress has authorized, it most effectively
can decrease the large civil backlogs in numerous districts; promptly,
economically, and equitably decide the growing, increasingly complex, civil and
criminal caseloads; and felicitously address the appellate "crisis ofvolume." 12

8. Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 16 JUDICATURE
282, 296 (1993) [hereinafter Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy]; Sheldon Goldman, The
Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 14 JUDICATURE 294, 296-98
(1991) [hereinafter Goldman, The Bush Imprint]; Tobias, Rethinking, supra note 5, at
1270-74.
9. Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 8, at 296; Goldman, The Bush
Imprint, supra note 8, at 296-98; Tobias, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 1270-74.
10. See generally Sheldon Goldman & Elliott Slotnick, Clinton's Second Tenn
Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265 (1999); Carl Tobias, Filling
the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309 (1996); Joan Biskupic,
Clinton Given Historic Opportunity to TransfonnJudiciary, WASH.POST, Nov. 19, 1996,
atA19.
11. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 10, at 276-77, 281-88; Carl Tobias,
Choosing Judges at the Close ofthe Clinton Administration, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 827,
839, 846 (2000) [hereinafter Tobias, Choosing Judges].
12. See, e.g., JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 103-05 (1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp/CVRPGTOC.HlM;
REPORTOFTHEFEDERALCOURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT OF
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2. Political Ideology
You also must resolve more vexing issues. One conundfum is the weight
to assign ideology. In the election, you characterized Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas as your "favorite" Justices and said that you would place
"strict constructionists" on the lower courts. 13 Some of your supporters may
consider these statements as campaign pledges to enhance balance on the bench
and to counter the ostensibly liberal views of Clinton appointees. For example,
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair at the
outset of the 107th Congress, promised during 1996 to "stand firm and exercise
the advice and consent power to insure that President Clinton [did] not pack the
judiciary with liberal activists." 14 Your striking success in galvanizing
Republican support reflected the party's strong desire to recapture the White
House. Judicial selection, thus, appears to offer a politically cost-free means of
cultivating conservative constituencies. 15
'
Before you embrace ideology, however, consider several countervailing
factors. First, the need to offset judges whom President Clinton named seems
less than compelling. Even ifthe notion of"judicial activism" could be clearly
defined, it cannot be confined to these jurists or to liberals. 16 Indeed, the Justices

THE FEDERAL COURTS]; STAT. DIV., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE U.S. COURTS: 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 16, 19, 20, 23-25,
available at http://www/uscourts.gov/judbus 1999/contents.html.
13. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, The 2000 Campaign: The Judiciary, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 7, 2000, at A28; David G. Savage, More Than Just the Oval Office at Stake;
Supreme Court: The Next President's Appointments Could Shape the Outcome of
Decisions for Decades, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at Al; see also Jeffrey Ghannam,
Going Head to Head, 86-0ct. A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (2000) (providing similar views of
Governor Bush).
14. Neil A. Lewis, Utah Senator Scolds Critics ofProsecutor in Whitewater, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1996, at A12. For more analysis of Senator Hatch's role as chair, see
Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744, 752 (1997) [hereinafter Tobias, Choosing Federal
Judges]; An Interview with Senator Orrin Hatch on Courts, Legislation, and Judicial
Nominees, THE THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1995, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/nov95/hatch.htm.
15. Appointing conservatives is an article of faith for those with conservative
views on social issues, such as abortion and school prayer. "No more Souters" is their
rallying cry. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Clinton Warns ofBush's Effect on Supreme
Court, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2000, at Al.
16. Compare Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 889
(4th Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), with
Brzonkala, 169 F .3d at 890 (Wilkinson, J., concurring); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Next
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, § 6 (Sunday Magazine), at 74, 76, 77-78.
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you favor receive trenchant criticism for being activists in the service of
conservatism. 17 Rather few Clinton appointees apparently engage in activism or
are very liberal because President Clinton de-emphasized political views, and
stressed gender and racial balance, and competence, choosing many attorneys
who had prior judicial experience. 18 In fact, President Clinton described them
as "mainstream judges,"19 while he rejected "rigid adherence to a strict
ideological agenda"20 and liberal observers' importuning to name ju.'"ists who
would counter judges chosen by Republicans.21 Even Senator Hatch conceded
that Carter "appointees were farther to the left'' than Clinton appointees.22 Ifyou
emphasize conservatism, nonetheless, it might be justified as a foil to Clinton,
but you should expect the same criticisms that Republicans leveled at him and
that Democrats lodged at the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Excessive
reliance on ideology will provoke sharp resistance and may prove
counterproductive.
The 2000 presidential and senatorial elections comprise an equally salient
countervailing factor. One clear conclusion from your race is the absence of a
mandate,23 which the even Senate split accentuates.24 In short, the presidential

17. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 112 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Bush, 531 U.S. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally SCOIT D.
GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1999); DAVID
A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE
ANTONIN SCALIA 82 (1996); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE
CONSTITUTION: TuRNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 3-5 (1990). Choosing conservative
jurists, such as Justice Scalia, who may possess less measured temperament, actually can
be less effective than naming jurists, such as Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice
William Brennan, or the Clinton appointees. For example, balanced temperament can
facilitate agreement on controversial issues.
18. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 10, at 273-82; Tobias, Choosing
Judges, supra note 11, at 838-39, 846.
19. See Biskupic, supra note 10; see also supra notes 10-11, infra note 27, and
accompanying text.
20. See Biskupic, supra note 10; see also supra notes 10-11, infra note 27, and
accompanying text.
21. See Ted Gest, Disorder in the Courts? Left and Right Both Gripe About
Clinton's Taste in Judges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1996, at 40; Neil A.
Lewis, In Selecting FederalJudges, Clinton Has Not Tried to Reverse Republicans, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1996, atA20.
22. See Biskupic, supra note 1O; see also supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
The Clinton Administration may be the first since that of Dwight D. Eisenhower to
decrease politicization ofjudicial selection.
23. President Reagan claimed that he had a public mandate to make the federal
government, in general, and the courts, specifically, more conservative. See supra note
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results afford no mandate to choose conservatives, and the Senate returns leave
little flexibility, while both phenomena dictate that you proffer compromise
nominees. Thus, you should treat your statements about favorite Justices and
strict constructionists as campaign rhetoric, not ironclad pledges, and you,
therefore, should de-emphasize ideology.

3. Diversity
Similarly complex is the relevance that you should accord gender and racial
diversity. Observers criticized your non-judicial appointments in Texas because
they included few too women and minorities. 25 This charge mirrors criticisms
directed at Presidents Reagan and Bush for selecting tiny numbers of minority
lawyers. Do not forget that your father named many women,26 while President
Clinton chose unprecedented numbers of female and minority counsel. 27 These
efforts offset somewhat the racial imbalance that the Republican administrations
maintained and the lack of gender diversity perpetuated by President Reagan.
Nevertheless, disparities remain.
There are several important reasons why you should appoint more women
and minorities. First, female and minority jurists can enhance their colleagues'
understanding of complex issues, such as abortion and discrimination, which the
bench addresses. 28 Second, female and minority judges will reduce gender and
racial bias in the courts. 29 Moreover, selection of these jurists would be a sign

6 and accompanying text.
24. This changed when Senator Jeffords became an independent. David Rogers,
Sen. Jeffords Defects from GOP, Creating Era of 'Tripartisanship ', WALL ST. J., May
25, 2001, at A16.
25. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, The 2000 Campaign: Running Texas, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2000, at A 1; supra notes 7 & 9. But see Ghannam, supra note 13, at 43;
but cf Jeffrey Toobin, Women in Black, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2000, at 77 (discussing
conservative female judges in Texas).
26. See, e.g., Goldman, Bush 's Judicial Legacy, supra note 8, at 286; Tobias,
Rethinking, supra note 5, at 1273; see also Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal
Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477, 477 (1991) [hereinafter Tobias, More Women].
27. See, e.g., supra notes 10-11.
28. See, e.g., Marion Z. Goldberg, Carter-Appointed Judges-Perspectives on
Gender, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 108; Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative
Action for the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488, 494 (1979); Slotnick, supra note 3, at
272-73.
29. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 12, at 169; NINTH
CIRCUITTASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS &ETHNICFAIRNESS,FINALREPORT (1997),
available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/OCELibra.nsf/eb93ae8ffblfcb
7488256394006a5c7e/5925a569c39bbbff882564e70002017d/$FILE/finalrep.pdf;Lynn
Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus for Judicial Reform, 21
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of your commitment to improving conditions for women and minorities in the
nation, in the justice process, and in the legal practice. The public also has
greater confidence in a bench whose composition reflects that of the society.30
You must attempt to fill all ninety openings with highly competent judges
who increase gender and racial diversity. Once you have canvassed potential
selection goals thoroughly and enunciated clear, laudable objectives, you should
develop efficacious measures to realize them.

B. Procedures for Achieving Your Goals
In the campaign, you promised to reduce partisan bickering and to urge
Senate action on nominees within sixty days ofnomination.31 These are worthy
ideals, although certain political and institutional realities might frustrate their
achievement. For instance, some individuals and entities participating in
selection consume much time. Resource and related intrinsic limitations mean
that Federal Bureau of Investigation "background checks," American Bar
Association ("ABA") Standing Committee on Judiciary qualification ratings, and
Judiciary Committee candidate investigations may slow efforts to process
nominees. 32 Relatively arcane operating procedures and the press of other
business could preclude completion of Senate scrutiny in two months.33
Furthermore, senators from the areas with vacancies can veto consideration;
unanimous consent permits one member to delay floor action, and cloture
requires sixty votes. Despite these obstacles, you can foster incremental
improvement by attempting to set deadlines, streamline nominee evaluation, and
promote bipartisanship through cultivation ofDemocrats.34

.ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237, 238 (1989).
30. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Carter's Judicial Nominees, 62
JUDICATURE 246, 253 (1978); Slotnick, supra note 3, at 272-73; Tobias, Rethinking,
supra note 5, at 1276. The facility with which your administration resolves this issue
also might indicate how inclusive your presidency will be.
31. See, e.g., Maria L. LaGanga, Bush Vows to Cure a Dysfanctional D.C., L.A.
TIMES, June 9, 2000, atA14; Governor Bush Delivers Remarks on Government Reform
at Knoxville Event (June 8, 2000) (transcript available through the Federal Document
Clearing House, available at http://www.fdch.com/net4.html).
32. See, e.g., Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination ofthe
Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319, 333-37 (1994); Carl Tobias,
Federal Judicial Selection in a Time ofDivided Government, 47 EMORYL.J. 527, 532-39
(1998).
33. A trenchant example was the need to respond to the September 11 terrorist
attacks.
34. For valuable, recent proposals that could facilitate selection, see Thomas 0.
Sargentich, Report of the Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection of Citizens for
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1. General Procedures
First, you publicly must announce your goals and practices. Clearly
explaining the ideas will inform those involved in selection and the public, and
it should facilitate appointments. You must decide what responsibility to lodge
in the White House and the Department of Justice, as well as how much to honor
the preferences ofsenators from states where openings arise. Presidents Clinton,
Bush, and Reagan left control over all Supreme Court and most appellate
nominees in the White House, deferred to senators on many district court
vacancies, and assigned to the Department of Justice major responsibility for
investigating attorneys once they became serious candidates.35 The choice of
Justices and circuit judges deserves little analysis, as you probably will maintain
control over selection. For example, White House Counsel should ensure that
staff understands your objectives and employs the best means to attain them.
The choice of Justices also will depend on unpredictable factors, such as who
resigns and whether it is an election year, but the appointments' significance and
their potential to consume already scarce resources for lower court recruitment
require that you plan for this contingency by compiling a "short list" of strong
candidates. Because recent administrations with diverse philosophies found
similar measures effective, dramatic change is not indicated.
You must work closely with the Senate Judiciary Committee, which
exercises primary responsibility for the confirmation process; its Chair; and
specific Senate members. For instance, the Chair could be a valuable ally, as he
schedules nominee committee hearings and votes, and can affect floor action on
lawyers whom the panel approves. You should seek his counsel freely on the
confirmation process and particular candidates. Informal consultation also will
improve selection. Thus, before actually nominating candidates, you should
solicit views of the Chair, and from influential senators and lawmakers from
areas where seats open. Remember to enlist aid from the Senate Majority
Leader, who controls floor consideration of nominees and has keen appreciation
of the chamber's operations.
You should attempt to derive instructive insights from history. For
example, consultation has facilitated confirmation during most recent
presidencies. Moreover, Republicans blamed delay on submission immediately
before Senate recesses of many Clinton nominees, some of whom the thenmajority found unacceptable; these phenomena purportedly frustrated committee
review. 36 Your administration can avoid this situation by steadily tendering

Independent Courts, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1031, 1038-43 (1999); Eliminating Unnecessary
Delays in Filling Federal Judicial Vacancies, 83 JUDICATURE 100, 100 (1999).
35. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. GERHARDT, THEFEDERALAPPOINTMENTSPROCESS 124-
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manageable numbers of well-qualified candidates. You correspondingly might
seek the advice of officials who have helped recruit judges since 1989.37
Keep in mind your presidency's rather nascent status and the role of
politics, which suffuses the appointments process. Do not forget that selection
will proceed slowly and receive close attention, especially at your
administration's outset. Thus, you should evaluate politics' effects, especially
on the choice ofnominees. Newly-elected chief executives also haveareservoir
of goodwill and exercise much authority when naming judges, but they have
finite political capital to spend on the appointments.38 Remember that a single
controversy involving selection can derail the whole process, as recent disputes
demonstrate.39

2. Special Efforts to Increase Diversity
You should pursue a course of action that will enhance gender and racial
balance. One helpful starting point is yourpredecessors' endeavors. You should
assess salutary ways to redouble the efforts of the first Bush and the Clinton
Administrations. For example, each President wrote the senators in his political
party, encouraging them to suggest women.40 The choice of district court
nominees requires more specific analysis, as recent chief executives have
deferred to lawmakers where vacancies arose.41 You might ask Senate members

25, 333 (2000); Tobias, Choosing Judges, supra note 11, at 843; Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial
Nominee Confirmations Smoother Now, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1998, at 9A;
see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 10, at 268, 271-73.
37. Examples are Clinton Administration Assistant Attorney General Eleanor
Dean Acheson and Deputy White House Counsel Bill Marshall, as well as Bush
Administration White House Counsel Boyden Gray.
38. For the idea that President Clinton spent little political capital on selection,
especially on controversial candidates, see Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 10, at 270;
Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World ofJudicial Confirmation in the Era ofHatch
and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REY. 247, 315-22 {1999); Ana Puga, Clinton Judicial Picks May
Court the Right, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1994, at 1.
39. These involved vacancies in the Utah district court and on the Federal Election
Commission. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S4366 (daily ed. May 24, 2000); Lizette
Alvarez, Senate Deal Ends Logjam on Nominees andJudges, N.Y. TIMEs, May25, 2000,
at Al9; Dan Camey, Clinton's Deals with GOP on Judgeships Stir Discontent Among
Democrats, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. 845 (Apr. 10, 1999); David G. Savage,Federa/Benches
Left Vacant Over Utah Tug of War, L.A. TIMEs, May 10, 1999, at Al.
40. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Unmaking the G.O.P. Court Legacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1993, at AlO (providing Clinton's request); Tobias, More Women, supra note
26, at 479-80 (providing Bush's request).
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. The president traditionally has
retained virtually exclusive control over selection for the Supreme Court and much
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to institute new or apply existing approaches, such as district judge nominating
panels, which will delineate, and foster the selection of, female and minority
counsel.42 Senators and your assistants could enlist aid from traditional entities,
such as bar associations, and less conventional ones, including women's and
minority political groups, to identify promising candidates. You also must seek
help from all thirteen female members of the Senate who can urge their
colleagues to propose and promote confirmation of women and minorities. As
essential will be the capabilities and networking of female and minority
attorneys, who now constitute more than a quarter of the American bar; of
women and minorities in your Cabinet; and of Martha W. Barnett, the ABA
president

3. Other Specific Action
You should assess, and perhaps invoke, other actions that will permit you
to fill each empty seat and to name more female and minority judges. One direct
measure would be to nominate talented candidates, numbers of whom are
women and minorities, for the openings. If Democratic senators do not
cooperate, you could force the issue by using the presidency as a bully pulpit to
criticize them. A second idea is orchestrating the passage ofa bill that authorizes
new judgeships.43 You can justify this approach because the Judicial Conference
premises recommendations for additional positions on carefully-calibrated
estimates of judges' workloads and court dockets,44 both of which have
expanded since 1990 when Congress last enacted comprehensive legislation.45

control over selection for the appeals courts. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
43. See S. 3071, 106th Cong. (2000); S. 1145, 106th Cong. (1999); see also
WILLIAMH. REHNQUIST, 200 l YEAR-END REPORTONTHEFEDERALJUDICIARY, available
athttp://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/ 2001 year-endreport.htrnl. See
generally Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges, supra note 14, at 749; Can the Federal
Courts Cope Without More Judges?, THE THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1999, at 1, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/nov99ttb/cope.htrnl; Judicial Conference Asks Congressfor
New Judgeships, THE THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 2000, at 2, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/augOOttb/judconf.html.
44. See, e.g., JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
21-23 (Mar. 16, 1999); Tobias, ChoosingFederalJudges,supranote 14, at753. But see
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF
JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS {Mar. 8, 1999), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-grassley/releases/l 999/p9r03-07 .htm#chrpt; J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1161-63
(1994).
45. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Title II, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified in scattered sections ofU.S.C.); see also supra note 12 (affording

2002]

DEAR PRESIDENT BUSH

11

You even might allow the Democrats to suggest some nominees in return for
confirmation of Republican candidates or approval of a judgeships statute.46
Indeed, one bold compromise would beresubmittingparticularClintonnominees
or elevating certain of your predecessor's district court appointees. Remember,
President Clinton named Roger L. Gregory as the first African-American
member of the Fourth Circuit through a recess appointment.47 The Democratic
chiefexecutive concomitantly placed on the appeals<:ourt..s Ann Claire Williams
and Sonia Sotomayor, whom Presidents Reagan and Bush had named to the
district bench.48

ill.

CONCLUSION

Now that you have entered the White House, attention must focus on the
formidable duties of governing. Judicial selection is one area in which your
presidency will receive much scrutiny. The development of clear goals and
efficacious procedures for securing those objectives will facilitate the
appointment of excellent judges, many of them women and minorities, to all
ninety vacancies. How carefully you discharge this complex, delicate task may
be a critical test of your administration's political and organizational skills.

the relevant docket data). See generally GERHARDT, supra note 36, at 302 & n.38.
46. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 10, at 271; see also S. 1145, 106th Cong.
(1999). Passing a statute may be fruitless, absent an improved confirmation process. See
Bermant et al., supra note 32, at 320-23; Tobias, More Women, supra note 26.
47. See President William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Recess Appointment of
Roger L. Gregory to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and an
Exchange with Reporters, in 36 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 3163, 3180 (Dec. 27, 2000);
Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Names a Black Judge; Skirts Congress, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 28,
2000, at Al; see also U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 3; United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d
1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). See generally Thomas
A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article Ill Courts: The Use of Historical
Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1758 (1984). You astutely
renominated Judge Gregory, whom the Senate confirmed in 2001.
48. See Tobias, Choosing Judges, supra note 11, at 841-42, 846. You wisely
nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Judge Barrington Parker for the Second Circuit in
2001. President Clinton had appointed Judge Parker to the Southern District of New
York. Chief Justice William Rehnquist recently urged the Senate to expedite the
confirmation process and Congress to pass a judgeship bill. See REHNQUIST, supra note
43.

